Does “true suffering” actually exist? When we claim to experience “true suffering,” we implicitly assume the existence of “pseudo-suffering.” Otherwise, if suffering were simply suffering, there would be no need to qualify it with the word “true.”
On the other hand, pseudo-suffering certainly exists. There are moments when we doubt whether someone is truly suffering. However, while the claim itself may be self-deceiving, it does not mean that suffering is absent. Rather, it suggests an inexpressible form of distress lies within.
What is labeled as “pseudo-suffering” often finds no room for acceptance. This “pseudo” nature stems from the fact that either the self or others have failed to grasp the essence of the pain. Without grasping that essence, acceptance is impossible.
This is not to say that grasping the essence of suffering makes it inherently acceptable. Suffering is something that has the potential to be sublimated when it is perceivable and acceptable to oneself or others. In this sense, what is dismissed as “pseudo-suffering” lacks the opportunity for sublimation, often concealing a different, underlying pain.
When suffering is labeled “pseudo,” it does not mean a “true suffering” exists elsewhere. It is a question of what the “actual suffering” truly is. Furthermore, this involves the question: “For whom” is this suffering “pseudo”?
“Pseudo-suffering” is an evasive manifestation of “actual suffering.” Evasion refers to the displacement or modification that occurs when expressing pain—a process that is almost inevitable unless the expression is fully accepted.
The essence of suffering is something felt through the body. Emphasizing one’s own pain by comparing it to others’ only clouds and accumulates that essence. This stems from seeking the resolution of suffering through external validation. Yet, there is undoubtedly suffering that cannot be resolved without such external acceptance, suggesting the very limits of the physical body.
Incidentally, social disputes are often framed as conflicts of ideology. However, behind them lies the history of “how one has experienced suffering.” For instance, the loneliness accompanying inherited privilege and the poverty endured in the process of achieving success are both poignant forms of suffering.
Whether mental or physical, suffering is experienced through the body. This suffering often does not conclude within the self; it sometimes requires external acceptance to be resolved. The nature of suffering as a bodily experience, and its resolution through external acceptance, is homogeneous across many human experiences.
However, the origins of suffering are frequently heterogeneous. The loneliness and heteronomous suffering that come with inherited privilege differ from the poverty and autonomous suffering endured while striving for success. While the processes through which these pains arise are different, they are homogeneous in that both are felt bodily and demand external acceptance.
Many social disputes likely follow this structure of “homogeneity in experience and divergence in origin.” Because these sufferings share the same structure, they compete for recognition, leading parties to delegitimize each other’s pain as “pseudo.”
Finally, while the body serves as a common foundation, ethical priority is a separate issue. I have addressed the former; the latter (the ranking of priorities) is beyond the scope of this essay. It goes without saying that being “bodily” does not necessarily mean “equal in value,” and differences in intensity or urgency require separate normative consideration.
